Comment on Professor Gluck\u27s  Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts by Posner, Richard A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2015
Comment on Professor Gluck's "Imperfect Statutes,
Imperfect Courts"
Richard A. Posner
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Posner, "Comment on Professor Gluck's "Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts"," 129 Harvard Law Review 11 (2015).
  
11 
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR GLUCK’S  
“IMPERFECT STATUTES, IMPERFECT COURTS” 
Richard A. Posner∗ 
Professor Abbe Gluck is far more steeped in the scholarly literature 
on statutory interpretation than I, and far more familiar with the 
workings of Congress than I, including the specific legislative process 
that generated the provision of the Affordable Care Act1 that was at 
issue in King v. Burwell.2  It would be an impertinence, therefore, for 
me to criticize her Comment, and I have no inclination or intention to 
do so.  But I do have experience in judicial interpretation of statutes, 
being a judge, and I do have my own ideas about statutory interpreta-
tion, and they differ somewhat from Professor Gluck’s.  They differ in 
being simpler, cruder — and cynical.  And being simpler and cruder, 
they can be set forth with considerable brevity. 
Professor Gluck sees the Court struggling in the King case to work 
out an approach to statutory interpretation that would be based on a 
realistic understanding of the modern Congress and a sense of the 
proper balance between Congress and the courts in determining the 
meaning of particular statutes.  She discusses theoretical approaches 
such as textualism,3 and interpretive rules such as the “canons of con-
struction,”4 and sees the Supreme Court Justices trying to use these 
approaches and rules and other analytical tools to figure out the best 
interpretation of statutory provisions that get drawn into litigation.  
The picture is of judges as neutral problem solvers. 
I daresay that some judges (and Justices) some of the time actually 
use these approaches and these tools (other than as window dressing), 
and that more think they are using them but aren’t really.  But I think 
that most of the time statutory interpretation is better described as 
creation or completion than as interpretation and that politics and con-
sequences are the major drivers of the outcome.  So take this old 
chestnut: an ordinance states “no vehicles in public parks.”  An ambu-
lance driver is ticketed for ignoring the ordinance (though its text is 
clearly posed at the entrance to the park) by driving the ambulance in-
to the park to save a person who has fallen into a pond and is strug-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 119, 213–14 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 36B (2012)). 
 2 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 3 Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the 
Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63–64 (2015). 
 4 Id. at 91–93. 
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gling.  Has the ambulance driver violated the ordinance?  Yes if the 
ordinance is interpreted literally.  But the literal interpretation has ab-
surd consequences.  A judge is apt to say: the city council, or other of-
ficial body, that enacted the ordinance couldn’t have wanted the ordi-
nance interpreted literally.  They “meant” there to be an exception to 
the prohibition of vehicles, but just forgot to write it into the ordi-
nance.  So a correct judicial “interpretation” is that “no vehicles in 
public parks” means “no non-emergency vehicles in public parks.” 
This is the right result, but I don’t think it’s a product of interpre-
tation.  Through carelessness, haste, stupidity, or some other defect in 
the legislative process, a critical provision was left out of the ordi-
nance; and the courts, to avoid a bad consequence, will pretend it’s 
there.  Which is essentially what happened in King v. Burwell.  Be-
cause of the extraordinary complexity of the congressional process (au-
thoritatively described in Professor Gluck’s article) that resulted in the 
enactment of the 2700-page Affordable Care Act, the Act said “an Ex-
change established by the State” where, to avoid absurd consequences 
in states that had failed to create their own exchanges, it should have 
said either “an Exchange established by the State or the Federal gov-
ernment” or just “an Exchange.”5  So in effect the Supreme Court ei-
ther inserted four words (“or the federal government”), or deleted all 
but “Exchanges,” in order to avoid a bad consequence. 
But in what sense “bad”?  Three Justices dissented, in an opinion 
by Justice Scalia.6  Two of the Justices who repaired the Act by in ef-
fect rewriting the exchanges provision, Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Kennedy, are conservative, as are of course the three dissenters 
(Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).  Conservatives hate the Afford-
able Care Act, because they hate any emanation of President Obama.  
(They did not hate the quite similar statute that Mitt Romney engi-
neered for Massachusetts when he was Governor of that state, because 
Romney is one of them.)  Justice Kennedy is erratically conservative, 
but how to explain Chief Justice Roberts’s votes in both Affordable 
Care Act cases decided by the Supreme Court, the 2012 challenge to 
the entire Act7 and the 2015 challenge to the exchanges provision?  
Professor Gluck suggests that Chief Justice Roberts is struggling to al-
ter the relation of the courts to Congress in statutory cases,8 but an al-
ternative is that he is struggling to preserve the Supreme Court’s, and 
his own, standing in the public eye.  2012 was a presidential election 
year; 2015 is the first stage of the next presidential campaign.  A deci-
sion against the Affordable Care Act in either case would have been a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Id. at 76–77. 
 6 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 7 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 8 Gluck, supra note 3, at 110. 
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gift to the Democrats in campaigning for the Presidency, because the 
decisions would have created turmoil in the health care market and 
would have deprived many people of subsidized health benefits, and 
would have been produced by a judicial majority consisting exclusive-
ly of appointees of Republican Presidents (Reagan and the two Bush-
es).  As Chief Justice, Roberts would have been a particular target, as 
Warren was the particular target of critics of the extremely liberal 
“Warren Court,” because the public has a tendency to identify the 
Court with its Chief Justice. 
I don’t know Chief Justice Roberts; I am not privy to his thinking.  
I suppose it’s possible that his decision in the King case was the prod-
uct of protracted rumination on the academic and other extrajudicial 
literature on statutory interpretation — the works of H.L.A. Hart and 
Henry Hart and William Eskridge and John Manning and Felix 
Frankfurter and Learned Hand and Antonin Scalia and countless oth-
ers, including Professor Gluck — but I am dubious. 
If I’m right that the superstructure of doctrine and scholarship that 
dominates judicial and academic discussion of statutory interpretation 
is largely superfluous to an understanding of what judges do when 
they “interpret” statutes, the question arises why the superstructure has 
been erected.  There are multiple answers.  One is that judges tend to 
tread cautiously when dealing with legislatures, because legislatures — 
Congress, if one is speaking of federal judges — have considerable 
power over judges with respect to appointment, removal, salary, and 
tenure.  Legislators do not bridle at common law, because, though it is 
judge-made “legislation” in a realistic sense, it is subject to legislative 
revision.  But they do not — and especially members of Congress do 
not — cotton to aggressive judicial interpretation of their handiwork.  
They are likely to consider it an encroachment on legislative preroga-
tives.  So judges like to pretend that when they interpret a statute they 
are merely articulating what the legislature intended but expressed 
imperfectly. 
Another cause of the judicial pretense (for I think it is largely pre-
tense) of judicial deference to Congress is a desire of judges to hide be-
hind the “law” — “the law made me do it” might be a judicial motto.  
Most judges would be profoundly uncomfortable having to explain 
that they had “interpreted” a statute in a particular way because an is-
sue had arisen that the legislators had not envisaged when they enact-
ed the statute and so the judges resolved it in what they thought was a 
sensible way at least roughly congruent with what the statute seemed 
to be concerned with.  In short, judges prefer for reasons of self-
protection to be thought of as agents rather than as principals. 
Another obstacle to meaningful statutory interpretation that judges 
are reluctant to acknowledge is that a statute is the output of a group 
rather than of an individual.  The legislators who voted for the statute 
may not have agreed on its scope of application, so that if a new and 
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unforeseen issue within the statute’s semantic scope arises it may be 
impossible to say how the legislature would have resolved it had they 
foreseen it.  But the judges still have to decide, though the decision 
cannot be “interpretive” in a meaningful sense. 
Still another cause of the elaborate conceptual structure that has 
arisen to enable meaning to be assigned to vague or inapt or ill-
considered statutory provisions is that judges and law professors are 
forever “complexifying” law.  They will not leave well enough alone.  
Take the matter of “standards” of appellate review.  They are many, 
including plenary review, abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious, 
substantial evidence, clearly erroneous.  The impression conveyed is 
that the weight that an appellate court gives to a lower court’s or ad-
ministrative agency’s decision varies in accordance with the particular 
standard applied.  But the only real as opposed to nominal difference 
is between plenary review, of pure issues of law, and mildly deferential 
review, of findings of fact and applications of legal doctrines to facts 
found by the lower court or agency.  Review of pure issues of law has 
to be plenary as otherwise, within a single federal circuit for example, 
different district judges might adopt and apply different rules of law.  
For the rest, difficult cases will be resolved by affirmance of the lower 
court or agency if the appellate court agrees with the result, considers 
the case a toss-up, or, though dubious or uncertain, is willing to defer 
because impressed by the seeming competence and demonstrated 
greater familiarity of the lower court or agency with the facts. 
With regard to judicial review of statutory issues, we have, in part 
as a counterpart to the confusing medley of standards of review, the 
fifty-seven canons of construction approved by Justice Scalia and Mr. 
Garner in their formidable treatise,9 and we also have the Chevron 
doctrine10 and the “hard look” doctrine11 and “plain meaning” and leg-
islative purpose and much else besides.  And yet if one considers the 
interpretation of difficult literary and historical texts (the Bible for ex-
ample), one discovers that it’s done by critics and scholars without the 
aid of a system of rules.  For interpretation is a natural process; we do 
it any time we hear someone speak and any time we read anything.  
Interpretation can be difficult but it isn’t made easier by bringing a 
formal apparatus to bear; it is made easier by familiarity with the texts 
to be interpreted.  And cases must be decided even if interpretation is 
impossible and the judges must bluff their way to a decision — which 
is often. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
 10 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 11 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
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I mentioned political factors, which I think must have played a role 
in the votes of the Justices in the two Affordable Care Act cases.  But I 
don’t want to exaggerate the influence of those factors on judicial de-
cisions.  They are only a subset of the “priors” that influence judicial 
decisions.  Confronted with a novel issue to resolve, one often will 
have an intuitive, even an unconscious, response; and while that re-
sponse may be modified or even abandoned as one gathers evidence 
bearing on the issue, it often will still have an impact, sometimes a de-
cisive impact, on one’s final decision.  And that is true in judging.  
Judging is not a hard science, a soft science, or any kind of science.  
Law is not a scientific discipline even to the extent that the social sci-
ences are scientific.  And the result is that judges’ priors, which in-
clude but are not exhausted by the judges’ political or ideological lean-
ings, are bound to influence many of their decisions.  This need not be 
a bad thing, because their priors will often be fruits of experience and 
insight.  My point is only that the more difficult it is to gather evidence 
to challenge one’s priors, the more likely the priors are to determine 
the outcome of a case. 
Because interpretation is so natural, instinctive, and 
unsystematized an activity, notably in law, priors, including political or 
ideological ones, are bound to influence many decisions involving the 
application of statutes.  King v. Burwell may well have been one such 
decision and National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius12 (the predecessor Affordable Care Act case) another. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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